Solvency II will become the new regulatory framework for insurance companies in Europe. Solvency II aims to determine the capital requirements in function of the risk exposure of the insurance undertaking.
risk exposure of the insurance undertaking.
We argue in this paper that, unless the specic characteristics of the long-term nature of certain insurance contracts are taken into account in Solvency II, the framework will not contribute to a more accurate risk measurement for said contracts. Moreover, it will inadvertently lead to a fundamental change in the nancial nature of long-term insurance products.
First, we will extend the deator formalism for defaultable bonds developed by M. V. Wüthrichto include a time-variable spread process. Using the extended formalism, we will show that Solvency II will induce large capital ows that were up to now not necessary in the long-term insurance business.
We then show that the volatility of the capital ows depends on the denition of the market value of the non-tradable liabilities and on the frequency at which the capital is computed. These capital ows and the volatility associated will render products such as pensions much more expensive.
We estimate this price increase by considering the (exotic) option an insurer could decide to buy, to eliminate the extra volatility due to the Solvency II framework. This exotic option is constructed by considering the non-tradable insurance contract linked to a unique policyholder, versus a risk-free bond, while imposing the condition that the payout to the policyholder remains equal in both cases.
Keywords: Solvency II, Long-Term Insurance Products, volatility, defaultable bonds, spread process, matching adjustment.
